INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION AND DEFENCE GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA: LEVERAGING ON WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH

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ABSTRACT
The lack of culture of collaboration inside the federal agencies in Nigeria, has led to poor adaptability and flexibility in the current defence governance system in Nigeria. As a result, the absence of inter-agency coordination and collaboration pushes agencies to focus on their own objectives and ambitions. With current security challenges in the country, the need for inter-agency collaboration is becoming increasingly important and has been recognized as a prerequisite for ensuring the country's national security. In order to be effective, the defence governance framework cannot only be a collection of individual parts. A notion that might produce a coordinated effort amongst intergovernmental agencies to optimize all available resources in a joint effort is a whole of government approach to planning, programming, and budgeting for defence governance. Addressing current security threats is more about identifying, avoiding, and managing disruptions, such as the development of terrorist activities, banditry, separatist agitations and global pandemics. Due to this, a comprehensive strategy to defence governance at all levels of government has been recommended. The paper interrogates inter-agency collaboration and defence governance in Nigeria, and recommends ways to leverage on whole of government approach.

Keywords: Inter-agency, Defence, Governance, Whole, Government and Approach.

INTRODUCTION

The primary responsibility of government is to guarantee the safety and security of citizens. This responsibility is essential to ensure sustainable peace that would enhance national development. To this end, it became necessary for governments to evolve robust response to address contemporary security challenges. Security organizations were formed to safeguard citizens, the state, and its infrastructure. Some of the most prevalent security threats that nations face today are: terrorism, piracy, banditry, kidnapping and secessionist agitation. In order to combat these threats, nations must leverage on whole of government approach on interagency collaboration with various security institutions on planning, organizing and conducting operations.

When utilizing a multi-dimensional approach to conflict resolution, it is necessary to collaborate with other agencies in order to be successful. Achieving successful defence governance against both internal and foreign threats requires inter-agency collaboration. The goal of such collaboration is to combat instability, reduce crime, promote true growth and progress, and ultimately, to increase public confidence. These collaborative efforts, which at times include the integration of many agencies, can be challenging. To address varied threats, joint operations teams must use a combination of centralized control and decentralized execution. This is accomplished by clearly defined guidelines and responsibility. As a result, due to the complex nature of current conflicts and the necessity of a multi-dimensional approach to their settlement, joint operations are frequently encouraged. Similarly, defence governance is the techniques for forecasting, planning, directing, coordinating and controlling human, physical and information resources for achieving the aims of national security. In a period of varying security threats and changing strategic environment and strategic requirements, there is a growing need to extract maximum benefit from defence governance.

The whole of government approach to interagency collaboration entails the integration of the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) efforts with a plan that identifies and aligns with its goals, objectives, task and support structures with designation of coordinating, collaborating and supporting security agencies. This approach may also be used to refer to FGN agreed structures and processes intended to facilitate whole of government efforts. A well-integrated FGN security operations and relationship using a whole of government approach will facilitate FGN engagement with non-FG stakeholders fostering a comprehensive approach to security.

Nigeria is increasingly faced with a myriad of security concerns of various types and dimensions. The degree of reaction from a variety of security and law enforcement agencies targeted at resolving the country's security concerns has increased in this rapidly shifting security landscape. In recent decades, this sectorial reaction has unfortunately resulted in conflicts between different security forces at various periods. From clashes between law enforcement officials and numerous other reports in the public domain, these reports not only reveal the deep-seated contention that pervades the security institution's entire fabric, but also highlight Nigeria's deplorable state of interagency collaboration. To make matters worse, rather than taking responsibility and work toward effective solutions to the problems, the country has increase in the trading of blames for such events by these organizations.

Nigeria has a multi-layered security system in place to combat threats to the country's national security. The constitution empowers the NPF to deal with any internal threat, and expect the armed forces and other agencies to work with the Nigeria Police Force in a coordinated manner to help eliminate such a threat. The Nigerian Armed Forces, which include the Nigerian Army, Navy, and Air Force, are mandated by the Nigerian Constitution to eradicate any external danger to national security, and other

security agencies are supposed to help them in fulfilling this mandate. The Police and other para-military agencies such as NIS, SSS, NCDSC, NPS, NDLEA, and the Federal Road Safety Corps, alll of these organisations exist to help One another avert dangers and challenges to defence governance. According to Section (25) of the Third Schedule of the 1999 Constitution, the National Security Council's composition implies the envisaged inter-agency cooperation among security agencies (a-i) (FRCN, 1999).

Although a whole of government approach has been employed in defence governance through the involvement of different security organisations in multidimensional inter-agency operations, however, officers and personnel from different security organisations have been involved in inter-agency rivalry, which has significantly impacted negatively on inter-security activities in the nation. These security agencies are expected to be collaborating in the fight against insecurity in the country. However, it has been difficult to achieve this objective as criminals and non-state terrorist actors continue to exploit the gaps in defence governance.

The purpose of this paper therefore is to evaluate the whole of government approach to inter-agency collaboration and defence governance in Nigeria. The paper will conceptualize the key variables. It will give an overview of the whole of government approach to inter-agency collaboration and defence governance. Furthermore, the paper will highlight the challenges confronting the whole of government approach of inter-agency collaboration in defence governance, before examining the consequences for inter-agency collaboration in defence governance. Finally, strategies to enhance inter-agency collaboration for defence governance will be proffered. The paper will cover 2011 to 2021. This is the period when the need for inter-agency collaboration and rivalry became more obvious because of the escalating level of violence occasioned by deteriorating security situation in Nigeria. This paper is based on primary source of data collection. Intensive desk

top review and interview were the main method of data collection - key informants including military, police and other security agencies official from ministries, departments and agencies were interviewed using a predetermined interview schedule. The views and perspectives garnered from these interviews facilitated the refinement of the paper assumptions and provide evidence to interrogate these assumptions. The paper will also cover the conceptual analysis, theoretical framework, comparative experience of whole of governance approach to inter-agency collaboration and defence governance in the United States of America, the challenges confronting whole of government approach to inter-agency collaboration and defence governance and the way forward.

Conceptual Analysis

Inter-Agency Collaboration

Interagency collaboration is a modern concept of collaboration in which various organisations within and outside of government work to achieve a common goal. In order to achieve a shared objective, collaboration requires the participation of all groups and agencies, and it has shown to be a powerful catalyst for progress. Although there is no one comprehensive definition for collaboration at its most fundamental level, it is widely understood to relate to the collaborative action of multiple groups in an effort to work for a shared goal. The goal of inter-agency collaboration is to bring people and organisations together.

Pendleton (2010) sees interagency collaboration as activities involving or representing two or more agencies, particularly government entities that agree to collaborate on a shared purpose. Cheminais (2009) viewed inter-agency collaboration as the desire to overcome difficulties. For him, security threats required the collaboration of all authorities in order to plan and carry out duties.

He saw the necessity of uniting all agencies in order to maximize the potential of each one in order to be successful overall.

For Edmund (2015), inter-agency collaboration means the collaboration between government agencies and other organisations in order to reduce duplication of effort and promote synergies aimed at increasing the overall quality of services provided by the agencies. Jeffrey (2014) on the other hand, collaboration as creating collaborative partnerships with the federal government, states, viewed inter-agency local authorities, private business, and non-governmental organisations in order to advance defence governance. According to the authors, the federal government relies on a few agencies to offer critical operational and intelligence resources in support of defence governance by serving as the core block for the preventive and response architecture.

Defence Governance
The concept of the uniqueness of a country's defence when compared to the other civic organisations in the country provides a clear explanation for the concept of defence governance. Defence institutions are unique and distinct from the nation's civil service structure in every way, including legal status, human rights, citizen rights, rules, resource allocation processes, accountability, and openness.Some countries have a comprehensive system of tools for national security, which as a system is meant to fulfil the security needs of all citizens (Balathandayutham, and Muralidhuran, 2021). Consequently, it would be accurate to claim that defence must be distinguished from the other civic organisations in the case of unique challenges or crises.It is frequently noticed throughout liberal and mature democracies that a more evolved society has structured methods and processes for the whole subjective and objective control as well as responsibility of security sector organisations (Balathandayutham, and Muralidhuran, 2021).

Modern defence governance should be designed in such a way that they are capable of resolving the difficult relationship between the three primary areas of defence activities, which are politics, command, and administration. It is critical to establish a definite division of authority and responsibility among administrators, commanders, and politicians. (Balathandayutham, and Muralidhuran, 2021). This is required for the preservation of institutional cohesiveness as well as the coordination of the organization's various processes. This approach proves to be difficult, and each country performs it in accordance with its own customs, bureaucratic culture, and level of socioeconomic progress.

For the development, reformation, or transformation of defence management to become a rational tool for the defence organisation, it is necessary to acknowledge that all of the individuals involved (managers, commanders, and politicians) carry out their activities in specific internal and external contexts (Balathandayutham, and Muralidhuran, 2021). It becomes more important for managers, commanders, and politicians to identify and comprehend the ways in which the aforementioned environments influence the growth and evolution of defence organisations, as well as their performance, in order to be effective. The wide range of the policy for defence, its implementation, and its evaluation show that the defence organisations are well-integrated in both their internal and external contexts, which is why they are so important.

Christopher (2004) views defence governance as that aspect of defence sector supervision that addresses matters of resource distribution within defence departments to ensure the most efficient utilization of resources in peace and war. In as much as the aforementioned definition is instructive. On his part, Cole (2002) asserts that defence governance is the sum total of planning and administration put into the allocation of resources for a defence sector to facilitate strategic and operational activities in a

comprehensive manner. Cole's definition highlighted vital elements of defence governance but omitted its objective. It is against this backdrop that Barros (2014) sees defence governance as the process undertaken by the state to control, coordinate and manage resources in a defence sector to help provide appropriate and sustainable mechanisms as well as support systems and infrastructure in order to meet national objectives for the defence of a country.

Whole of Government Approach
The term "whole of government" has been defined as a term that encompasses variety of measures to the problem of rising fragmentation of the public sector and public services, as well as a desire to strengthen integration, coordination, and capability. There is difficulty in untangling the concept of 'whole of government'. According to the literature, there is a "bewildering storm of terminology" in use, as well as a wide range of interpretations assigned to these phrases (Fafard, 2013). Definitions of 'whole of government' also vary. Some definitions capture operational objectives, such as coordination and integration, while others focus on expected outcomes; yet others address the scope or 'reach' of the reform intent, and some attempt to address all of these concepts Whole of government work is motivated by the goal of eliminating "silos," or agencies functioning in isolation from one another, and creating a more integrated government. It tries to prevent overlapping and contradictory policies, and to maximize the influence of government by employing all of the State's tools in an integrated manner in support of specific goals. A desire to reduce costs (Kearney, 2009) and inefficiencies can also drive the adoption of a whole of government approach.

For the Organization for Economic Cooperation Development (OECD), whole of government approach is a technique in which a government deliberately leverages its own official and/or informal networks to co-ordinate policy initiatives across agencies with the

purpose of boosting the overall efficacy of the policy interventions. The reason for such an approach has been increasingly evident in recent years, as development and military players have grown more aware of the limitations of traditional diplomatic and military operations that are carried out in a piecemeal fashion. A greater degree of convergence between security and development strategies is therefore essential for the establishment of an effective Whole of Government Approach (WGA) for fragile nations. Among the many advantages of a Whole of Government Approach is that it can help to achieve the overarching goal of long-term development and stability in fragile nations at a lower total budgetary cost than other options (OECD, 2006).

Benefits of adopting a whole of government approach

Source: (Colgan, Kennedy and Doherty, 2014).

Successful whole of government approach depends on clear objectives, political commitment, viable integrated government structures, strong cultures of collaboration and incentives to collaborate. Engaging successfully in all aspects of government operations requires:

a. Leadership: for the entire government to function, strong political and administrative leadership is required. Ministers and top government officials must be committed to the approach.

b. Culture: Whole of government structures are necessary, but not sufficient for effective whole of government work – new cultural capacities, cultural readiness and behavioral change are essential. Key cultural capacities include the ability to work across boundaries, build strategic alliances and relationships, negotiate, manage complexity and capitalize on opportunities afforded by interdependence (Colgan, Kennedy and Doherty, 2014).

c. New ways of thinking: the whole government approach necessitates a re-alignment of understandings regarding goals, duties, and outcomes, as well as a shift away from specific departmental objectives (Colgan, Kennedy and Doherty, 2014).

d. Networked governance: This involves new forms of accountability, targets, budgetary management systems and performance indicators. It also requires a focus on monitoring and evaluation of policy implementation and outcomes (Colgan, Kennedy and Doherty, 2014).

e. Structures that align with purpose: The objective must be shared by all government ministries and other interagency/interdepartmental bodies. The longer the goal, the higher the requirement for formal institutions. Short-term projects may rely on informal arrangements, whereas initiatives aimed at achieving long-term change may need more permanent structures, including legislation.

f. New work processes: Work processes that are most important in whole-of-government approach include clear and sometimes restructured lines of accountability, budgetary parameters and roles, risk management systems and performance management systems that reward whole-of-government approach, and whole-of-government reporting arrangements (Colgan, Kennedy and Doherty, 2014).

g. Managing gaps: Core dimensions of the linkages among key actors to be managed as part of a whole of government initiative have been termed 'gaps' by the OECD (Chabit and Michalun, 2009). These include the information gap, the capacity gap, the fiscal gap, the administrative gap and the policy gap

h. Providing support: Capacity development initiatives are a feature of whole of government work in several countries and include building repositories of shared lessons and experiences, practice guidelines, joint training, networking initiatives and access to learning and development supports.

National Defence

Throughout history, defence is an important form of struggle that seeks to quell the enemy's offensive, and represents a number of measures taken in order to achieve this, whereas security (a newer concept compared to defence) is a state of fact. In addition, national defence is the state, the basic notion of a state under which national interests are defined, developed, and promoted through the institutions authorized by the Constitution to do so. In the course of this process, all available resources at any given time are committed to ensuring the preservation of sovereignty and independence as well as unity and territorial integrity, constitutional democracy, and national interests in the face of any form of aggression or threat to sovereignty or independence.

The goal of national defence is to maintain the state of democratic normality to which the society as a whole, including citizens, communities, and the state, aspires, through efforts that are directed toward the establishment of legality, economic growth, social balance, and political stability. In order to achieve this, citizens must be able to fully use their rights and freedoms, as well as accept their obligations, and the state must be recognized as a contributing member of the community and international organizations. The notion of national defence has changed over time, and it now encompasses a wide range of domains in different countries. To put it in a more general context, the national defence designates:

"All measures and provisions of any kind adopted by a state, which has as its object the assurance at any time, in any circumstance and against any form of aggression, of the security and the integrity of the territory, and also the life of the population" (Moştoflei and Duţu, 2004). In other words, this concept refers to the activities and steps that each particular State takes to defend the lives of its citizens, its own property and national territory, and to ensure independence. In general, national defence is concerned with preventing the chance that something that belongs to a state (such as its people, territory, legacy, property, values, and qualities, among other things) is endangered by the change of the inmate's status for a certain period of time.

For Victoria (2018) national defense is thus crucial in order for a nation to have a reasonable security state to guarantee security and public order for the population, having in it multidisciplinary capacities interconnected and instrumented through a system of guidelines to be followed and which were politically determined as the National Defense Policy, is also important to protect state assets and interests both inside and outside the national borders. He further argued that it has to do with the country's security both inside and outside its borders, and it includes other factors (as

already mentioned) in addition to the military forces. The government develops public defence strategies to ensure that this security is maintained. These regulations are frequently based on academic studies as well as government intelligence agency research and analysis (Victoria, 2018).

Theoretical Framework
There are various theories that could be used to explain the relationship between inter-agency collaboration and defence governance. The paper adopts Collaboration Theory.

Collaborative theory includes analytical frameworks for understanding the collaborative process and its goals as a consequence of many types of study and reflection. Mark Elliot and Trebor Scholz are two of the most prominent proponents of Collaboration Theory. In 2007, Mark Elliot proposed a comprehensive paradigm for collaboration that has now gained widespread acceptance. The contrast between cooperation, coordination, and collaboration is emphasized in this paradigm, with each action reliant on the preceding while dealing with higher levels of complexity (Elliot, 2007). He believes that concerns such as the mutual creation of common knowledge are critical in a collaborative approach. Trebor Scholz, for his part, developed 19 guidelines essential for collaboration in 2007. Among the Guidelines are developing trust, mutual respect, and keeping to agreements (Scholz, 2016). *See Scholz's 19 Guidelines for Collaboration are enumerated at Appendix 1.*

Collaboration Theory proponents argue that shared aims, a sense of belonging, open communication, complementary diversified talents and knowledge, and intellectual aptitude are all required for collaboration to succeed (Scholz, 2016). Furthermore, collaboration is possible by the appropriate mixture of people who are good at working together. Its goal is to produce collaborative achievements that the participants would be unable to achieve

working alone, particularly in complicated environments and systems. Additionally, open space meetings and chats are excellent instruments for collaboration to grow. Collaboration Theory, according to its proponents, is hindered by four obstacles. The first is 'stranger danger,' which is defined as a hesitation to disclose information with somebody you do not know. Following that comes the phrase "needle in a haystack," which refers to the difficulty of identifying persons or organisations that hold the answer to an issue. 'Hoarding' is another obstacle to information sharing since it is viewed as a source of power. Finally, 'not invented here' refers to a situation in which a solution was not developed by the group itself and was instead developed by someone else (Stephen, 2014).

According to the theory, appropriate fines might be implemented to encourage players to be unselfish. Scholars such as Susan Feinstein have levelled a number of criticism against the Collaboration Theory in the past. Specifically, she pointed out that the Theory is founded on a functionalist theory of society rather than a conflict theory of society. Another critique is that action/implementation is frequently an issue since the persons involved in the process are not forthright about their intents and goals, which leads to confusion (Feinstein, 2010). Feinstein's criticisms are valid; nonetheless, collaboration among players would be required due to the benefits that would accrue from such cooperation. Collaborative efforts, according to Mark Elliot, are contingent on cooperative efforts. As a result, despite Feinstein's criticisms, actors would be obliged to collaborate for the sake of their own survival and advancement.

In light of the aforementioned, Collaboration Theory is particularly applicable to this paper since it thrives in situations where there are common goals amongst agencies. As a result of this work, law and order must be restored and peace and stability must be maintained, which are goals that the security services and other stakeholders in

Nigeria strive to achieve. The ability to work collaboratively is especially advantageous while working in complicated situations. Trainings, joint planning meetings, and technology are all necessary instruments for collaboration, as is the use of common language. These are typical activities carried out by security agencies on a daily basis. Finally, the fact that there appear to be disparities in the norms and processes of the agencies suggests that they would be unwilling to exchange information with one another. Interagency collaboration and defence governance in Nigeria: leveraging the whole government approach will be analyzed in light of the foregoing.

Comparative Experience of Whole of Government Approach to Inter-Agency Collaboration and Defence Governance in United States of America

The United States in the twenty-first century must contend with an increasingly complex and dynamic global strategic environment. International boundaries that are contested, growing powers, economic disparity, political instability, social upheaval, sectarian strife, environmental changes, and the development of weapons of mass destruction will all have an impact on the national security of the United States (Derleth, 20108). Unlike during the Cold War, most of these challenges cannot be met via economic and security partnerships, with the military providing nuclear and conventional deterrence.

The first post-9/11 National Security Strategy, released in 2002, marked a significant shift in the emphasis placed on the implementation of national security policy. For the first time, international development was recognised as a critical component of the overall plan. Since then, every national security policy has emphasized the significance of taking a "Three D" (defence, diplomacy, and development) approach to national security that involves the whole government (Derleth, 2018). To achieve long-term peace and stability, the Department of Defense (DOD),

Department of State (DOS), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) collaborate in order to achieve success. While there are various obstacles that have prevented the full implementation of this instruction, two stand out: a lack of stability and civil-military operations education, as well as a lack of integrated, inter-agency training and exercises. In 2003, USAID recruited a small cadre of Foreign Service officers specializing in crisis, stability, and governance as part of its endeavour to meet this new national security objective. These officials, known as Backstop 76ers, are tasked with planning and carrying out humanitarian, transitional, and governance tasks in unstable or politically risky areas (Derleth, 2018). When it comes to inter-agency collaboration, joint planning, and execution, they have limited impact in areas critical for success. Several reasons contributed to this, including a lack of interagency training or experience, a low risk tolerance, a preference for traditionally produced officers over those with conflict zone expertise, and a compartmentalized approach to programming in unstable environments (Derleth, 2018). Mission success necessitates the seamless collaboration of military and civilian personnel, as well as with allies and partners, international organizations, and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), all of which have overlapping mandates and often divergent objectives, to achieve the mission's goals.

Despite the fact that the Department of Defense, Department of State, United Nations Development Programme, and other agencies are collocated in our embassies, they are not adequately trained in crisis response, resulting in unnecessary delays and the possibility of mission failure as interagency personnel learn "on the job" about one another's roles, resources, and expertise (Derleth, 2018).

Challenges Confronting Whole of Government Approach to Inter-Agency Collaboration and Defence Governance
Poor Coordination and Collaboration
Nigeria depends on unplanned mechanisms referred to as Joint Task Forces (JTF) to tackle insecurity, these JTF operations are typically created from the army, navy, air force and also the police. In some cases, other para-military and security agencies such as the Nigerian Prisons Service, Nigerian Customs Service, Nigerian Immigration Service, and Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency are co-opted into the JTF operation. However, building seamless communication, cooperation, collaboration culture and infrastructure to enhance togetherness for effective operations still remains a huge challenge (Sedgwick and Hawdon 2019). Currently, some level of coordination and collaboration exist between the various security agencies in Nigeria, however information sharing is readily not available and sometimes they are hoarded and other agencies are treated with suspicion, leading to information gaps. According to Haruna (2018), the unfortunate incident that led to the abduction of the Chibok and Dapchi school girls shows how command and control coordination and collaboration among security institutions caused grave breaches to national security and safety of citizens. The police and army argued over who takes over the town's security in Dapchi. It remains a concern that intelligence agencies were also unaware of the movement of terrorists from their base around the fringes of the Lake Chad up to Dapchi town (Leo, Mutum and Matazu, 2018). It shows the lack of unity and harmony among the various security agencies.

Inter-Agency Rivalry
Security experts and political scientists in several nations have expressed worry about inter-agency rivalry among security agencies due to its adverse impact on defence governance. This contradiction typically manifests itself during internal security

operations, such as the ongoing counter-insurgency operations in North East Nigeria (Saleh, 2020).

Inadequate Joint Training

Inadequate joint training among personnel of security agencies before deployment in internal security operations has a negative impact on collaboration, which has resulted in the failure of operations in across the country (Nicholas, 2018). Counter-terrorism training was not a major element of military and security agency training in Nigeria until the recent Boko Haram sect's asymmetrical terrorist tactics. The asymmetric nature of Boko Haram tactics, which includes the use of explosives and suicide bombs, necessitated a shift in military and security agencies training toward collaboration (Nicholas, 2018). However, the conduct of joint counter-terrorism training has been plagued by obstacles, such as the lack of harmonized doctrine and a dedicated center for joint counter-terrorism training. The Armed Forces and Command and Staff College train a small number of security personnel in counterinsurgency operations, but this is inadequate. As a result, many security personnel deployed in the North East lack the necessary understanding of joint operations (Nicholas, 2018).

Furthermore, inadequate joint training at lower ranks has also contributed to a lack of trust and respect by preventing the development of common objectives, a grasp of agency operations, and appropriate expertize (Marama, 2017). In this regard, joint training, which might improve teamwork by instilling confidence, competence, and camaraderie among personnel, often falls short in this area, due to lack of harmonized training standards for the various security agencies to use in training their personnel.

Lack of Policy Framework

Despite the presence of bodies such as the National Defence Council (NDC), the National Security Civil and Defence Council

(NSCDC), the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB), and the Intelligence Community Council (ICC), a national intelligence policy is absent (Dambazzau, 2018).Even when individual intelligence agencies or their supporting organizations have sought to craft a policy to govern intelligence practice, it is frequently limited in scope and lacks legislative support (Saleh, 2020). The limitation has a detrimental effect on intelligence community personnel' ability to perform their duties. It may be difficult to provide an impartial assessment and evaluation of the impact of intelligence on upholding the Constitution.

Furthermore, the rise of Joint Task Forces, intelligence operation centers and fusion centers has brought together professionals from across the law enforcement, military, and intelligence communities offering them a unique opportunity to share tools and techniques in defence of the nation. However, there is lack of cooperation between military intelligence authorities and the State Security Services on the one hand and between the intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies on the other (Wakili, 2018). This anomaly is responsible for the massive intelligence failures in Nigeria and the triumph of domestic terrorists attacks such as Boko Haram in the north east.

In addition, issues caused by competing organizational goals; the cost of additional work resulting from collaboration; organizational constraints (often related to actors working in narrowly defined policy silos) (Iruenabere, 2012). There are gaps due to a lack of capability and organizational resources, as well as an unequal allocation of decision-making power among stakeholders. Furthermore, the operation is hindered by a lack of shared information among organizations and a piecemeal approach to providing services (Iruenabere, 2012). The issue of ineffectual interagency agreements is also a problem to be addressed. As well as sluggish and poor management procedures for forming interagency teams, there is a lack of mutual trust and confidence

among the stakeholders. Unfortunately, the covert nature of intelligence activities contributes to the public's impression of intelligence as a heinous practice (Akale and Ibeh, 2018). This impression has also resulted in a decline in mutual trust amongst practitioners. Some intelligence analysts believe they cannot rely on the veracity of intelligence products produced by other agencies in certain situations. They may mistakenly believe that such intelligence products include weak information, have low intellectual quality, lack rigorous analysis procedures, or use unclear or deceptive language. As a result, the intelligence supplied may not be used or simply disregarded, with a negative influence on inter-agency collaboration in operations (Akale and Ibeh, 2018).

Duplication of Roles amongst Security Agencies
As a result of weak constitutional provisions, several security agencies are duplicating their efforts, which makes inter-agency collaboration more difficult in some cases.The involvement of the Department of State Security (DSS), the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), and other paramilitary services in internal security operation brought to light the problem of a lack constitutional provisions for collaboration among participating security agencies (Dambazzau, 2018). The Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), for example, was established in 2003 by an Act of the National Assembly No. 2 of 2003 and was not covered by the NSA Act, which came before the NSCDC (Dambazzau, 2018).This has created the difficulty of duplication of tasks between some of the agencies, as well as a lack of confidence in the sharing of information and intelligence amongst them on a regular basis. The result has also been a proliferation of roles and duties, as well as the absence of an all-encompassing security strategy and coordination.

Operational error that might occur as a result of a communication breakdown. Communication is essential at all levels of combat for

command and control, as well as for the transmission of critical information and intelligence. For instance, the counter-terrorism campaign in the North East is a joint/combined operation including the Services, other national security agencies, and partner nations. These agents may work in the same place of the theatre or may be scattered in different locations. Whether co-located or deployed in different locations, there is almost always an essential requirement for coordination to create unity of effort. Robust communication is frequently used to achieve coordination. However, this critical aspect of collaboration is majority of times missing in the counter-terrorism effort in the north east. Most of the time, and this results in operational blunders in the form of fratricide or collateral harm to civilian populations. While the latter is rarely reported owing to the negative impact on morale and national security, there have been multiple incidents of people being killed inadvertently as a result of poor situational awareness.

Human Rights Watch Accused Nigerian forces of murdering 183 people and damaging 2,247 homes in Baga, Bornu State, in April 2013. This blunder garnered severe criticism from the international community, and the government eventually denied that Nigerian forces were involved. Military operations and the country's reputation were negatively affected by the operational failures mentioned. Fratricide not only weakens soldiers but also erodes trust, confidence, and camaraderie within armed units and allies, especially host communities. Furthermore, collateral damage to the civilian population creates animosity towards the military by the local population, whom the military is supposed to protect in the first place. As a result, the civil populace lacks cooperation, the battle for hearts and minds is lost, support for the insurgency shifts, and the insurgents utilize such failures as propaganda tools. All of this has an impact on achieving the operational goal and, by extension, winning the insurgency, which is a national objective.

The level of destruction of lives and properties is indicative of the state of interagency collaboration in defence governance in a nation. Activities of criminals and armed non state actors almost always result in loss of lives and properties. According to a Relief Web report (2020) almost 8 million people have been affected by the humanitarian crisis in north-east and more than 50,000 people have been killed and 1.6 million displaced (Relief web, 2020). Poor interagency collaboration between the various security agencies leads to high frequency of occurrence of wanton destruction of lives and properties. The confidence of citizens in security agencies capability to protect lives and properties will also diminish.

Conclusion
There must be improved unity of effort between the various security agencies in order to enhance defence governance. Despite attempts by the FGN towards whole of government approach, interagency collaboration has been ad hoc and has room for improvement. Given the continued shortfall in collaboration, these agencies must actively pursue additional measures to better collaboration efforts. Formulation of a national policy on interagency collaboration must be pursued to enhance the whole of government approach in interagency collaboration and defence governance. Additionally, closer collaboration will allow the government to prepare for necessary budgetary assistance to cover logistical and technical shortcomings. Also, to increase synergy, inter-agency training agendas can be devised. Most importantly, a centralised intelligence coordination system may be established. This is the foundation for a whole of government approach, purpose-built, unified response system that would improve security responses and offer a contemporary operational security framework. The whole-of-government approach to interagency collaboration and defence governance is a novel concept that encourages the federal government to think differently about how the country should deal with complex security threats that confront

the country. The existing defence governance structure must be transformed from a static concept to a dynamic one, according to the authors.

Recommendations

Need for Improved Harmonized National Fusion Centres
It is essential for the success of modern internal security operations and service delivery to have effective command and control (C2) and situational awareness of the information environment (IE). With the availability of spatial audio and video real-time information, in addition to the storage and analysis of information, it has become easier to record, prevent, anticipate crime, respond to emergencies, and identify them. Following the BokoHaram attack, ONSA developed a National Fusion Center with the help of the US government, and at the Presidency, an asset was created to conduct intelligence briefings to the National Security Council and the President. Furthermore, the NN Headquaters (Operation Falcon Eye, a maritime surveillance system), the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) for national and regional maritime domain awareness capacity have also similar assets. Improvement of centralized command and control for internal security operations in the country will mitigate the challenge of inter-agency rivalry militating against whole of government approach to inter-agency collaboration for defence governance. Internal security operations in the country is usually a joint operation involving the NA, NAF, NN, NPF, DSS, NCS, NIS, NCSD, FRSC, Prisons Service and DIA jointly conducting land and air operations. Evidently, internal security operations involve multifaceted tasks such as intelligence gathering, investigation, prevention of trans-border crimes, rescue operations amongst others. This calls for a joint intelligence/operation cell for analysis of information and production of intelligence among the security agencies. Defence Headquarters currently coordinates the different security agencies involved in these operations, for

effective collaboration to enhance defence governance. Thus, for effective command and control to enhance whole of government approach to inter-agency collaboration, DHQ should improve the command and control of the operation under a Joint Task Force and the NA retains as the lead agency.

Integrate Civilian Component into Inter-Agency Collaboration
In addition to the military component, interagency collaboration should also consist of both a military component and a civilian component. The civilian security sector includes a wide range of organizations, including law enforcement and intelligence agencies such as PCS, FFS, NIS, and NSCDC. The National Police Force (NPF) is also considered a civilian security organization.Other agencies that may be involved include the NIA, ICPC, EFCC, NIA, DSS, and the Ministry of Justice. Other civilian components of the national security architecture include the NDLEA, NAPTIP, NAFDAC, and NAS. The coordinating the work of these two components remains a challenge for communication, coordination, and collaboration.Hence, human-centric security reforms are important to allow civilians to have a larger role in interagency collaboration due to the central role they play in participating internal security operations. This can only function if the recruiting process is transparent and there is a curriculum that leads the desired practise.

Joint Doctrine
The formulation of a joint doctrine would mitigate the challenge of inadequate joint training of personnel for internal security operation in the country. A joint doctrine for training in the areas of intelligence, combat drills, and anti-banditry among others would improve capacity in the current internal security operations. It would also promote mutual respect, comradeship as well as command and control for inter-agency collaboration for enhanced defence governance. The Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) in consultation with the military and security agencies

could embark on the development of a joint doctrine as well as improvement of training facilities for counter terrorism in all relevant training institutions. In this regard, ONSA could convene a special committee to produce a joint doctrine for security agencies. ONSA could also facilitate appropriate equipping of training institutions with modern training aids.

Amendment of National Security Agency Act
The strategy to mitigate the challenge of lack of National Policy for intelligence practice and improve inter agency collaboration in internal security operation is the amendment of the NSA Act to include all security agencies and instruments for implementation. Having strong interagency relationships; a working knowledge of each agency's policies and procedures and an understanding of their differing missions will enable cooperation among the agencies. Also, joint training and regular information sharing and involvement of all relevant stakeholders in the planning phase and establishment of interagency protocols will strengthen cooperation among the agencies. Other issues to be strengthened will include sharing administrative data and joint case management. The establishment of enhanced togetherness at the coalition level to more efficiently conduct field operations. There is the need to have in place security architecture for the country and security policies including a national identification data bank. There is the need to listen to all key players and their objectives and gain multilateral consensus on strategic purpose and to consult with coalition partners to strengthen plans.

Review the National Security Strategy
To deal with the identified challenge of duplication of roles amongst agencies collaborating in internal security operations in the Nigeria, there is the need to amend the constitution. A constitutional amendment to cater for all the security agencies not covered in the present constitution would be necessary. The Executive Arm of Government should therefore initiate a bill to be

sent to the National Assembly to amend the constitution to cover all the security agencies hitherto not covered. The Federal Government (FG) should review the National Security Strategy (NSS) which would define roles and eliminate conflict, suspicion and mistrust between security agencies operating jointly. This should be articulated by the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) and submitted to the National Assembly.

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